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HOW MUCH AM I EXPECTED TO PAY FOR MY PARENTS’ FIRM?  
AN INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS PERSPECTIVE ON FAMILY DISCOUNTS 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent evidence suggests that successors do not simply inherit their parents’ firm, but have 
to pay a certain price. Building on institutional logics literature, we explore successors’ family 
discount expectations, defined as the rebate expected from parents in comparison to nonfamily 
buyers when assuming control of the firm. We find that family cohesion increases discount 
expectations while successors’ fear of failure and family equity stake in the firm decrease 
discount expectations. Higher education in business or economics weakens these effects. On 
average, in our study comprised of 16 countries, successors expect a 57% family discount. 
 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
Intrafamily succession, commonly seen as a distinguishing feature of family businesses (cf. 
Chua et al., 1999), constitutes one of the most intensively investigated topics within family 
business research (cf. De Massis et al., 2008; Sharma, 2004; Zahra & Sharma, 2004). Despite the 
significance and maturity of this research stream, we know surprisingly little about the prices at 
which family firms are transferred from one generation to the next. According to conventional 
wisdom, children simply inherit the family firm, thus receiving a 100 percent discount on the 
firm’s value. Preliminary evidence, however, shows that family-internal successors often pay a 
price for the family’s ownership stake (Christen et al., 2013). In fact, family business scholars 
and family sociologists contend that intergenerational transfers are rarely based on pure altruism 
(Karra et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001; Steier, 2003). 
Most research on price determination in private family firm transfers focuses on 
management buy outs, buy ins, and venture capital transactions (e.g., Granata & Chirico, 2010; 
Manigart et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2000), thereby neglecting family internal transfers of 
ownership. A recent study highlights the price premium incumbent owners expect when selling 
their firm to family-external buyers to compensate for forgone family internal succession 
(Zellweger et al., 2012). A few practitioners seem to partly touch upon the topic of family 
internal transfers by investigating estate and inheritance taxes that accrue to the incumbent owner 
when transferring the firm to a child (e.g., KPMG, 2014). The literature is silent about transfer 
prices of family business ownership, probably due to the inherently private nature of these 
changes in corporate control. From a practical standpoint, our lack of insight is highly 
unfortunate, given the predominance of family firms around the world and the relevance of 
family internal succession in the market for corporate control. 
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To address this research gap, we investigate the family discount that next-generation family 
members expect to receive from parents when assuming control of the firm, defined as the rebate 
expected in comparison to nonfamily buyers. We draw from the literature on the 
microfoundations of institutional logics (Pache & Santos, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012) and 
discuss how situational stimuli, such as familial cohesion, transgenerational legacy desires of the 
family, successors’ fear of failure, and family equity in the firm, impact discount expectations. 
We theorize that situational stimuli affect discount expectations by eliciting different social 
norms within the family logic. We further argue that for successors with higher education in 
business or economics the market logic is more accessible, which weakens the effect of the 
situational stimuli on discount expectations. 
Our study makes multiple contributions. First, we add to entrepreneurial exit and 
succession literatures (Dehlen et al., 2014; DeTienne & Chirico, 2013; Kammerlander, 2014; 
Wennberg et al., 2011) by shedding more light on the relationship between family norms and 
financial implications of the family-internal exit route, a topic that has been widely overlooked. 
Second, we speak to Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004), who explored the interdependent 
relationships between buyer and seller in the exchange of corporate control, and empirically 
explore their underlying arguments on transfers of corporate control as social exchange and on 
the concern for a mutually acceptable agreement. In the context of children and parents as buyers 
and sellers, we show how legitimacy concerns rooted in familial norms bias perceptions about 
appropriate prices.  
Third, we contribute to institutional logics literature (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et 
al., 2012) by exploring the multidimensionality of the family logic. Management scholars have 
tended to equate the family logic with norms of parental altruism, loyalty, and paternalism and 
see it as a largely monolithic way of sense making (Greenwood et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2011; 
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Thornton et al., 2012). Norms of reciprocity and filial duty, however, play a significant role in 
family relationships (Bengtson, 1993; Kohli & Kuenemund, 2003). Our study shows that various 
family norms entail contradictory indications of what constitutes a legitimate family discount and 
highlights an important, but underinvestigated, form of institutional complexity (see Greenwood 
et al., 2011 for an overview). The family logic has been applied to firm performance (Miller et 
al., 2011) and downsizing decisions (Greenwood et al., 2010), but never to the intriguing case of 
price expectations. This extension to management literature takes into account recent sociological 
approaches to price formation (Beckert, 2011). Fourth, our study lends empirical support to 
theorizing about the role of education in determining the accessibility of logics (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Pache & Santos, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012). Fifth, our study is important from a 
practical point of view because many family firms throughout the world are transferred from one 
generation to the next. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Institutional logics and family business research 
Institutional logics are defined as “socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural 
symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals 
and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce 
their lives and experiences” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). Scholars (Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Thornton et al., 2012) argue that fundamental institutions in society, such as the family and the 
market, imply particular logics that shape the actor’s interpretation of the world and define 
legitimacy principles through which role identities, personal goals, and expectations are 
constructed (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 2007; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). With 
awareness of institutional plurality, academics have rediscovered nonmarket logics as intriguing 
research avenues, particularly the family logic, and are investigating how the family logic 
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influences decision making in family businesses (Greenwood et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2011).  
Even though research on the family logic is gaining momentum, it remains unclear how its 
inner workings affect individuals’ expectations and, ultimately, decision making. This lack of 
insight resonates with researchers’ call for exploration of the inner workings of institutional 
logics in general and how individual actors relate to the social norms embedded in a logic (Pache 
& Santos, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012). In order to address this missing link, deeper insights into 
the microfoundations of institutional logics are needed, especially the cognitive aspects of 
institutional microprocesses (Greenwood et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). 
In their model on the microfoundations of institutional logics, Thornton et al. (2012) emphasize 
that institutional logics focus attention on certain role identities and social norms that guide 
cognition. While situational stimuli are said be important for eliciting certain social norms within 
a logic (Ocasio, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012), education is seen to be decisive in defining which 
institutional logic is most accessible (Pache & Santos, 2013). 
Situational stimuli, family norms, and the formation of family discount expectations 
In line with extant literature, we argue that the family logic plays a defining role in family 
firms (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2011) and should be highly accessible in the 
intergenerational transfer of family firm ownership. Unpacking the inner workings of 
intergenerational family relationships, family sociologists, such as Bengtson (1993) and Kohli 
and Kuenemund (2003), suggest four central family norms: parental altruism, parents’ self-
interested expectations for the future, filial reciprocity, and filial duty (filial piety). Parental 
altruism induces parents to care for their children (Becker, 1981; Becker, 1988; Kellermanns & 
Eddleston, 2004). In turn, parents’ self-interested motive for generativity elicits desires for legacy 
creation (Chua et al., 1999; Zellweger et al., 2012). Filial reciprocity is the familial expectation 
that the child reciprocates parental support (Gouldner, 1960; Janjuha-Jivraj & Spence, 2009). 
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Filial duty constitutes the child’s responsibility to support aging parents (Gans & Silverstein, 
2006; Silverstein et al., 1997). In the context of intergenerational transfers, these norms constitute 
the normative basis of legitimacy within the family logic. 
We build on the idea that situational stimuli, by focusing successors’ attention on the 
respective family norms, affect discount expectations (Thornton et al., 2012). In line with 
institutional thinking, we thus propose that situational stimuli affect discount expectations 
because they invoke certain social norms that guide expectation formation (Weick, 1995). 
Theorizing on the microfoundations of institutional logics suggests that the situational context 
primes individuals to follow appropriate social norms (Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Thornton et al., 
2012), a view that has deep roots in social psychology. Literature on cueing and priming 
describes how typified situational frames invoke certain social identities (i.e., roles) to which 
social norms and actions are tied (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Wheeler 
& Petty, 2001). For the case of our investigation we thus propose that the situational stimuli of 
family cohesion, family transgenerational control intention, successors’ fear of failure, and family 
equity stake affect family discount expectations because they invoke the respective familial 
norms of parental altruism, parents’ desire for legacy creation, filial reciprocity, and filial duty. 
While situational stimuli constitute salient contextual factors that focus attention on a 
certain logic (Ocasio, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012) and on the norms prevailing within that logic, 
accessibility refers to how easily that logic comes to mind in general (Thornton et al., 2012). Our 
research setting indicates that the family logic should be highly accessible because all 
respondents are part of the owning family. In contrast, accessibility of the market logic should, in 
part, depend on formal education (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Through norms of independence 
and individual rent seeking, the market logic is largely at odds with the family logic and should, 
therefore, undermine the legitimacy considerations invoked by situational stimuli of the family 
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logic. We thus suggest that higher education in business or economics serves as a source of 
market logic accessibility and weakens the effects of situational stimuli tied to the family logic on 
discount expectations.  
In the following, we will thus first present how four situational stimuli affect discount 
expectations because they invoke certain social norms that guide expectation formation. We will 
then theorize how these main effects are weakened in case actors are trained in business or 
economics. 
Family cohesion 
Family cohesion represents emotional bonding and feelings of closeness, belonging, and 
acceptance among family members (Johnson et al., 2001). Cohesive families tend to develop a 
sense of loyalty and responsibility among their members (Kepner, 1991). Family cohesion also 
engenders a preference for a collectivistic over an individualistic orientation (Lansberg & 
Astrachan, 1994). Kellermanns and Eddleston (2004) suggest that cohesive family interactions 
are characterized by altruism, which links each family member’s welfare to that of other family 
members (Ling et al., 2002; Schulze et al., 2002). Similarly, Corbetta and Salvato (2004) note 
that “a high degree of altruism influences individual conduct in family firms and helps strengthen 
family bonds” (p. 356). 
Extant research argues that in families with high levels of cohesion parental altruism is 
particularly prominent (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Schulze et al., 2002; Simon, 1993). In 
economic terms, parental altruism describes a relationship in which the utility of parents depends 
on the utility of their children (Becker, 1981; Becker, 1988). Religious and philosophical studies 
perceive parental altruism as a moral value that induces parents to care for children without the 
expectation of reward (Karra et al., 2006). Researchers stress that altruism is a key distinguishing 
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feature of family businesses (Karra et al., 2006) that motivates parents to care for their children 
and strengthens the intergenerational bond (Eshel et al., 1998; Simon, 1993).  
Building on this reasoning, we suggest that family cohesion increases discount expectations 
due to expectations of parental altruism. High levels of family cohesion should lead successors to 
expect parental altruism in the form of favorable financial conditions (i.e., high family discount) 
when assuming control of the family firm.  
H1: Family cohesion is positively related to family discount expectations of potential 
family-internal successors. 
Family transgenerational control intention 
We further suggest that the family’s wish for transgenerational control over the firm 
increases discount expectations of the successor. Transgenerational control over the firm occurs 
only when a next-generation family member assumes control of the firm. Thus, a next-generation 
family member should be considered a highly legitimate successor who is entitled to a significant 
family discount. 
In establishing this positive conceptual link between family transgenerational control 
intention and successors’ discount expectations, we rely on the self-interested human desire for 
legacy creation (Wade-Benzoni, 2006), which signals a strong wish within the family, in 
particular, of parents, for generativity (Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Miller et al., 2011). Generativity is the human instinct that produces a desire for symbolic 
immortality (McAdams & de St Aubin, 1992), which individuals achieve by creating a self-
defining legacy to be passed on to succeeding generations (Becker, 1997; McAdams & de St 
Aubin, 1992). Given that generativity and symbolic immortality are basic human desires (Wade-
Benzoni, 2006), scholars argue that family business owners tend to place great emphasis on 
intrafamily succession to ensure that the family firm continues to exist after their exit (Dehlen et 
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al., 2014). Creating a personal legacy via the family firm enables business owners to live on 
through their children (Greenberg et al., 1997). Indeed, family business researchers find strong 
evidence that the wish for transgenerational control is often of crucial importance to business 
owners, as it increases the owner’s subjective valuation of the firm when selling outside the 
family (Zellweger et al., 2012), drives owner emphasis on family-centered nonfinancial goals 
(Chrisman et al., 2012), and even distinguishes family from nonfamily firms (e.g. Chua et al., 
1999; Churchill & Hatten, 1997). 
We suggest that family transgenerational control intentions increase discount expectations 
of the successor because they reflect parents’ self-interested motive for generativity. High levels 
of transgenerational control intention of the owning family signal to successors that parents’ self-
interest is to create their legacy by transferring the firm to a child. Thus, the next-generation 
successor feels particularly legitimized to assume control and entitled to a significant discount. 
H2: The family’s transgenerational control intention is positively related to family discount 
expectations of potential family-internal successors. 
Successors’ fear of failure 
We suggest that successors’ fear of failure in managing the firm is negatively related to 
discount expectations. Fear of failure reflects a perceived lack of skills and capabilities in being a 
successful entrepreneur and running an entrepreneurial firm (e.g., Chen et al., 1998). Successors 
who are afraid of assuming control fear that they will be unable to successfully run the family 
firm (De Massis et al., 2014). Not only may entrepreneurial skills be imperfectly inherited 
(Bertrand et al., 2008), but assuming control from parents often represents a gift with strings 
attached; that is, the implicit expectation that the successor will reciprocate the favor of being the 
heir apparent and successfully continue the parents’ legacy (i.e., the firm) (Kohli & Kuenemund, 
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2003). For successors who are afraid of failing to manage the family firm the specter of failure 
thus implies the inability to reciprocate parental support. 
The norm of reciprocity constitutes a central aspect of human interactions and describes the 
fact that “we owe others certain things because of what they have previously done for us” 
(Gouldner, 1960, p.171). Within the context of intergenerational transfers, reciprocity is 
considered to be of particular importance (e.g., Janjuha-Jivraj & Spence, 2009; Karra et al., 2006; 
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). The prior generation expects reciprocity from the next 
generation via ensuring the prosperous continuation of their legacy, which ultimately enhances 
their own status in society (Janjuha-Jivraj & Spence, 2009). Therefore, the ability to reciprocate 
parental support by ensuring transgenerational success of the company is an important selection 
criteria for choosing the appropriate successor (Janjuha-Jivraj & Spence, 2009). Fear of failure to 
successfully run the family firm thus constitutes an important stimulus that focuses attention on 
filial reciprocity because it directly reflects successors’ ability to meet and reciprocate parents’ 
expectations. When fear of failure is low, the successor should feel particularly legitimized to 
assume control. This should result in higher discount expectations, because the successor will 
more likely be able to reciprocate parental support. When fear of failure is high, however, young 
generation family members are likely to be aware that, under the norm of filial reciprocity, they 
are neither preferred nor legitimate successors, which reduces their discount expectations.  
H3: Potential family-internal successors’ fear of failure associated with running the family 
firm is negatively related to their family discount expectations. 
Family equity stake in the firm 
We suggest that the higher family equity stake in the firm, that is, the more strongly family 
wealth is tied to the firm, the lower should be discount expectations. An undiversified wealth 
position of parents, most often represented by a high equity stake in the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 
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2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), means that a high discount engenders lower financial 
compensation of parents for transferring the firm, which has a strong negative impact on parents’ 
financial well-being, post succession. Thus, a high family equity stake not only signals high 
levels of control in the hands of parents but should also act as stimulus for the norm of filial duty 
in the transfer of control across generations, in particular amongst small private firm owners. 
Filial duty, also known as filial piety (e.g., Hwang, 1999) or filial responsibility (e.g., 
Matthews & Rosner, 1988), defines the social role adult children adopt with respect to their aging 
parents (Gans & Silverstein, 2006). Research on intergenerational relationships highlights that 
children are confronted with the normative obligation to support their parents and ensure their 
happiness in later life (Gans & Silverstein, 2006). According to the norm of filial duty, adult 
children are morally obliged to make sacrifices to ensure their parents’ well-being (Daatland & 
Herlofson, 2003; Lee et al., 1998). In consequence, the norm of filial duty runs counter to the 
expectation of a family discount, which would reduce parents’ prosperity.  
Researchers have argued that the norm of filial duty is more strongly converted into support 
if the (financial) needs of parents are high (Gans & Silverstein, 2006). When parents’ wealth is 
tied up in the family firm, it exposes parents to a compensation risk upon transferring control of 
the firm. Successors, then, should lower their discount expectations because a high discount runs 
counter to the norm of filial duty.  
H4: The family’s equity stake in the firm is negatively related to family discount 
expectations of potential family-internal successors. 
Moderating effects of the accessibility of the market logic 
While the family logic should be highly accessible to potential successors as part of the 
owning family, we suggest that the accessibility of the market logic should, in part, depend on 
formal education (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The institutional logics literature rests on the 
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assumption that prior education defines the individual’s attitude toward and embeddedness in a 
given logic (Bourdieu, 1990; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pache & Santos, 2013). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), formal higher education—next to professional networks, which are 
generally less relevant to young next-generation family members—is the most important source 
of logic accessibility and, ultimately, legitimacy. These authors write: “Universities and 
professional training institutions […] create a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who 
occupy similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation 
and disposition that may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape 
organizational behavior” (p. 152). Education provides access to templates of legitimate behavior 
and focuses attention on the norms inherent in the logic propagated by education (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Pache & Santos, 2013), thereby thrusting aside previously experienced, more 
traditional perceptions of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Through higher education in 
business or economics, the market logic becomes more accessible to potential successors (Pache 
& Santos, 2013), who then learn the paradigms of individual wealth maximization and 
isomorphic management thinking that promulgates independent, market-oriented, and rent-
seeking strategizing. 
Following Di Maggio and Powell (1983), we thus suggest that higher business or 
economics education partly overrides the more traditional sense making tied to the family logic 
and that successors will attend less strongly to family logic situational stimuli. For instance, 
family cohesiveness and transgenerational control intention are irrelevant in the market logic 
(Almandoz, 2012). Scholars have found that incumbent owners with high degrees of (business) 
education are less likely to employ family members for altruistic reasons and are more focused on 
financial aspirations (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; Klyver, 2007). The familial social norms of 
parental altruism and legacy building should thus be less salient for sense making in case the 
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actor is trained in business or economics. More formally stated, we thus expect that family 
cohesion (H1) and family transgenerational control intention (H2) lose effectiveness as 
situational stimuli when successors possess business or economics education.  
In a similar vein, fear of failure is likely to have less impact on discount expectations if the 
successor studies business or economics. Children’s obligation to reciprocate parental support by 
successfully continuing their parents’ legacy (H3) rests on the assumption that actors’ 
relationships are interdependent; however, successors adhering to the market logic assume that 
actors are independent (Almandoz, 2012; Friedman, 1970). The buyer does not have any 
reciprocity duties other than paying the agreed-upon price. Successors focusing on the market 
logic expect incumbent owners to demand a price that reflects the market value of the ownership 
stake. Personal financial circumstances of parents (i.e., the seller) that are relevant in the family 
logic and that engender a lower family discount, given the norm of filial duty (H4), are irrelevant 
to determine transaction prices in the market for corporate control. Under the market logic, prices 
reflect the current value of the future revenue strreams from the business, and should thus be 
independent of personal ties between buyer and seller. Accordingly, we predict that higher 
education in business or economics reduces the impact of family equity stake on successors’ 
discount expectations.  
H5a: Higher education in business or economics of the potential family-internal successor 
weakens the positive link between family cohesion and family discount expectations. 
H5b: Higher education in business or economics of the potential family-internal successor 
weakens the positive link between transgenerational intention and family discount 
expectations. 
H5c: Higher education in business or economics of the potential family-internal successor 
weakens the negative link between fear of failure and family discount expectations. 
H5d: Higher education in business or economics of the potential family-internal successor 
weakens the negative link between family equity stake and family discount expectations. 
METHOD 
14 
Sample and statistical procedure 
We used the 2011 GUESSS dataset, which contains a large number of potential family firm 
successors, to conduct our analysis.1 Data was collected with an online survey administered to 
students in about 500 universities in 26 countries between March and July 2011,2 resulting in 
93,265 responses. To limit our investigation to intergenerational family firm ownership transfers, 
we included only respondents who answered the question, “Are your parents currently self-
employed or do they have a majority ownership in a company?” with either “Yes, father,”; “Yes, 
mother,”; or “Yes, father and mother” (N=28,105). Detailed questions about succession were 
posed only to students who indicated that they had been thinking “repeatedly” about taking over 
their parents’ firm (students answering “never” or “sketchily” did not receive extra questions) to 
ensure that respondents answered the questions with adequate care and knowledge (cf. 
Thompson, 2009). This reduced the sample to 6,366 respondents. We excluded 207 students who 
already took over the majority of shares of their parents’ business and included only respondents 
who answered all necessary survey items and who came from a country where our country-level 
control variables were available. The final dataset consists of 3,293 responses of potential 
successors from 16 countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, England, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, and 
Switzerland. 
                                                                    
1 The GUESSS project investigates career choice intentions of students across the globe. See www.guesssurvey.org. For other 
studies using GUESSS data and the administration procedure of the survey, see Zellweger, Sieger, and Halter (2011), Laspita, 
Breugst, Heblich, and Patzelt (2012), and Lima, Lopes, Nassif, and Silva (2014).  
2 Start and end dates differed considerably between countries and between universities within countries. Start dates were between 
March and May 2011, and end dates were between April and July 2011. Students could win iPads, travel vouchers, or other 
items in raffles. GUESSS reports indicate a response rate of 6.3% (Sieger et al., 2011), which compares favorably to previous 
GUESSS editions (Fueglistaller et al., 2009) and other e-mail student surveys (Porter & Whitcomb, 2003). This, however, is 
very likely to be an underestimation. Not all universities may have invited all of their students, and student e-mail accounts may 
not always be used regularly. Given the uniqueness of the sample (size and scope), we believe that the benefits of using 
GUESSS data more than outweigh its potential disadvantages.  
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To test for item nonresponse bias, we applied Heckman’s (2005) sample selection 
technique. We first estimated a probit model with all our control variables where the dependent 
variable indicates whether respondents answered the family discount question. Using the 
predicted values of the probit model, we then calculated the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and 
entered it in our regression models (Berk, 1983). This variable was not significant (p>0.5) and 
did not change our results.3 
Given the nature of our dependent variable and the characteristics of our sample, we 
applied OLS regression while adding multiple country-level control variables to account for 
potential differences across countries. Even though our data is clustered on the country level, 
which prevents us from controlling for shared errors among respondents from the same country, 
we did not use multilevel models, mainly because the variance explained by country-level factors 
in our sample is below 5% and we did not hypothesize country-level effects. 
Measures  
Dependent variable. To measure expected family discount we asked respondents: “Assume 
that a family-external buyer would have to pay an amount of 100 for the family firm’s total 
equity. How much would you have to pay?” Framing the question in this way has several 
advantages. First, it does not imply that a discount is desirable or expected, as it does not ask for 
a discount expectation but for a transfer price expectation compared to a reference category. 
Second, using “family-external” as a reference category captures the price differential based on 
family membership, which is essential for our study. Third, the question refers to a general 
amount (100), not to a particular currency, which ensures comparability of answers across 
countries. Fourth, using “the family firm’s total equity” ensures that all respondents referenced 
                                                                    
3 We did not test for nonresponse bias by comparing data from early and late respondents, which is based on the assumption that 
late respondents are more similar to nonrespondents than are early respondents (Oppenheim, 1966). Due to the data collection 
procedure at GUESSS, identifying early and late respondents reliably is, unfortunately, not possible.  
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the same object and excludes valuation biases due to differences in the actual ownership stake 
held by parents. To identify expected family discount, we deducted all answers from 100; results 
range from 0 to 100 percent.  
Independent variables. For family cohesion (H1), the strength of bonding among family 
members, we used four items from the FACES III scale (cf. Olson, 1986; 1991): “Family 
togetherness is important,” “Family members feel very close,” “When family gets together, 
everyone is present,” and “Family members ask each other for help.” Answers range from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s Alpha reaches 0.83. Principal component 
analysis reveals that the items load on one component only, with high loadings between 0.76 and 
0.89 (p<0.001) (cf. Hinkin, 1995). For transgenerational control intention (H2), we used two 
items based on family business studies that explore two central features of transgenerational 
control (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chua et al., 1999; Zellweger et al., 2012): the importance of 
tradition and history and the long-term goal of controlling the firm. The items are: “Tradition and 
history play a very important role in our family business” and “We have the overarching goal of 
keeping the firm in the family’s hands in the long term.” Answers range from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The Pearson correlation is 0.605 (p<0.01). For successors’ fear of 
failure (H3), we used a three-item scale to capture fear of not being able to successfully manage 
the family firm in the future (e.g., Chen et al., 1998; Langowitz & Minniti, 2007; Shinnar et al., 
2012). Respondents indicated (1=not at all; 7=very much) whether “having the necessary 
entrepreneurial skills and capabilities” and “having relevant technical know-how” represent 
barriers to becoming a successor and whether they experience “fear of failure” about assuming 
control. Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.82. All items load on one component only, with significant 
loadings between 0.78 and 0.91 (p<0.001). For family equity stake (H4) (i.e., undiversified family 
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wealth) (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), we asked respondents: “What is the percentage of equity that 
is in the hands of your family?” 
Moderator variable. To capture if respondents are receiving higher education in business or 
economics (HEBE), we constructed a dummy variable coded “1” if students are studying in one 
of these two fields and “0” otherwise. For the interaction terms, we multiplied the standardized 
values of the independent variables by the moderator variable. 
Control variables. We included additional individual-, firm-, and country-level variables 
that might affect family discount expectations. On the individual level, we follow previous 
succession studies that highlight the importance of age (Stavrou, 1999), gender (Schroeder & 
Schmitt-Rodermund, 2013), and birth order (Goldberg & Wooldridge, 2004). Our gender 
variable is coded “0” for male and “1” for female; for birth order, we controlled for the number of 
older siblings.4 Because accessibility of logics should advance along with level of education 
(Kim et al., 2006), we added a dummy variable for study level ( “1” if the respondent was at the 
undergraduate level; “0” if on other levels). We included an entrepreneurship education dummy 
(“0” if students have not attended any entrepreneurship-related class; “1” if they have), which 
may constitute a further source of bias (cf. Souitaris et al., 2007). 
On the firm level, we controlled for performance of the family firm, as performance may 
make certain norms more or less salient. For instance, when the firm is performing well, the 
relevance of filial duty may be lower, as the necessity for children to ensure parents’ financial 
well-being is lower. We included a performance measure where respondents rated firm 
performance compared to competitors (1=much worse; 7=much better) over the last three years 
                                                                    
4 Unfortunately, the number of total siblings is not available. However, we have no reason to believe that our respondents are 
systematically early or late born; hence, the number of older siblings should serve as a reasonable proxy. This is confirmed by 
an out-of-sample-test with GUESSS data from 2014 where we find a high correlation between those two variables (coefficient = 
0.583, p<0.01). Number of older siblings may be even more appropriate for our purposes. For instance, in a family with five 
children, both the oldest and the youngest child have four siblings. However, the eldest child (zero older siblings) may 
experience an uncontested opportunity or pressure to take over; for the youngest child (four elder siblings), in contrast, the 
succession option is likely to be seized or has already been seized by the elder siblings.  
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based on four dimensions: relative growth in sales, market share, profit, and job creation (adapted 
from Dess & Robinson, 1984; Eddleston et al., 2008). Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.91. Item loadings 
range from 0.78 to 0.93 (p<0.001). Next to performance, firm size (Lee, 2006) and industry 
sector (e.g., in terms of competitiveness; see Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008) may affect family 
discount expectations. We included number of employees (full time equivalents) to account for 
size and two dummy variables that indicate two well-represented industry sectors in our sample, 
construction and services (“1” if the firm is active in the sector; “0” if not). 
The family’s long-term involvement in the business is a key characteristic of family firms 
(Chua et al., 1999), which may render the family logic more salient. We controlled for the 
number of years that the firm has been owned by the family (ownership duration), if the CEO is a 
family member (“0” if yes; “1” if no) (see also Astrachan et al., 2002), and the respondent’s 
personal equity share (%) in the firm, as the latter might affect perceptions about legitimate 
transfer prices. We considered if the respondent has ever worked in his or her parents’ firm (“0” 
for yes; “1” for no), as this indicates knowledge of the firm’s inner workings and may stimulate 
the prevalence of certain norms. We included one item that measures perceived knowledge and 
insight into the firm’s financial performance. Respondents indicated their level of agreement with 
the statement, “I have a good insight into the family firm’s (financial) performance” (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree). To account for emotional attachment to the firm that may affect price 
estimates (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008), we included the respondent’s affective commitment to 
the firm via a three-item scale based on Allen and Meyer (1990). Cronbach’s Alpha reaches 0.88; 
all item loadings are significant (p<0.001), ranging from 0.86 to 0.92. Finally, we assessed the 
degree to which assuming control of the firm is feasible and not a purely hypothetical scenario 
(feasibility of succession) by asking for respondents’ extent of agreement (1=strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree) to the statement, “In principle, and aside from my personal preferences and 
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obstacles/barriers, I could join the company if I wanted to do so.” Given the size of the firms we 
studied (mean firm size: 30.3 employees) and given the context in which the related question was 
asked in the survey, the possibility to join should have been understood by the respondents as the 
possibility to take over the firm. 
At the country level, we controlled for nation wealth (Wennekers et al., 2005) via gross 
domestic product per capita (GDPPC), retrieved from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Because in wealthier countries it tends to be easier to accumulate wealth, in part because of more 
advanced social security systems, parents can afford to be more generous when transferring the 
firm to children as they are less dependent on the proceeds. Using data from the GLOBE project 
(House et al., 2004), we controlled for three cultural dimensions: performance orientation (which 
might favor business logic), group collectivism (which might favor family logic), and power 
distance (as the acceptance of others’ power, authority, and privileges might lead to lower family 
discount expectations) (cp. Laspita et al., 2012; Mueller & Thomas, 2001). Because tax 
regulations may bias family discount expectations (KPMG, 2014), we included testamentary 
freedom per country (Ellul et al., 2010), representing to what extent parents are free to bequeath 
wealth unevenly to children (thus giving a discount to one child). Inheritance tax may lead 
potential successors to expect higher discounts, which may lower the tax burden for the family. 
We included a dummy variable indicating if inheritance tax exists (“1” if yes; “0” if no).5 As 
shown in Table 1, respondents expect a family discount of 57.1%, on average. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                    
5Information was retrieved from the “International Estate and Inheritance Tax Guide 2012” from EY (see  
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/International_Estate_and_Inheritance_Tax_Guide/$FILE/International_Estate_and_
Inheritance_Tax_Guide.pdf) and from KPMG publications (see http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/). We hoped 
to capture the inheritance tax issue in more detail; however, our review shows that inheritance taxes are highly heterogeneous, 
not only across countries, but also across individual succession cases. The applied inheritance tax rate and the tax-exempt 
amounts largely depend on a company’s legal form, the presence of real estate property involved in the transfer, and other 
characteristics. We thus refrained from estimating average inheritance tax rates per country. 
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Tests for validity 
To test whether our measures are empirically distinguishable, we applied Harman’s single-
factor test (1967) as a first step (see Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Entering all study variables into 
an exploratory factor analysis led to an 11-factor solution accounting for 59.55% of total 
variance. The largest factor accounted for 13.53% of total variance. An exploratory factor 
analysis with our multi-item independent variables revealed that all items uniquely load on their 
respective factors (factor loadings >0.71). We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis with our 
independent variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The corresponding structure fits the data well 
(χ2(30)=307.321, RMSEA=0.046, CFI=.981). The fit of a one-factor structure is significantly 
worse (χ2(37)=7733.519, RMSEA=0.219, CFI=0.485) and different (χ2=7426.198, df=7, 
p<0.001) from the proposed factor structure. Hence, our variables are empirically distinguishable, 
which provides initial evidence that common method bias should not be a serious concern. 
We analyzed our data with the common latent factor (CLF) approach (Podsakoff et al., 
2003), allowing items of our independent variables to load both on their theoretical constructs 
and on an uncorrelated common factor. Adding this factor did not significantly improve model 
fit, all original factor loadings remained significant. The potential presence of common method 
bias is further mitigated because we used a wide set of control variables and multiple independent 
variables that are only moderately correlated (Siemsen et al., 2010). Also, Siemsen et al. (2010) 
have shown that common method bias usually deflates nonlinear effects. We infer that finding 
significant interaction effects signals that common method bias should not be a serious concern. 
To mitigate social desirability concerns, respondents were assured strict confidentiality, 
which reduces the tendency to provide socially desirable answers (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We 
used z-standardized variables and found that the Variance Inflation Factors of our independent 
variables do not exceed 2.109. Thus, multicollinearity should not be a major concern.  
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We assessed power needs with a power analysis (Cohen, 1988), comparing the full model 
(including interaction terms, Model 4) to a model with main effects only (Model 3, Comparison 
A). We also compared the model with our four main independent variables (Model 2) to a model 
with control variables only (Model 1, Comparison B). For Comparison A at the power level of 
0.95, the required sample size is N=3,168; for Comparison B at a power level of 0.95, the 
required sample size is N=2,574. Both numbers are below our actual sample size of N=3,293, 
indicating sufficient statistical power to estimate the proposed relationships.  
We tested for potential endogeneity by applying the commonly used Heckman two-step 
procedure with multiple instrumental variables (cf. Baum et al., 2007; Heckman, 1976). For each 
of our four independent variables, we identified several variables that are related to the potential 
endogenous variable(s) and not to the dependent variable or to the error term in the regression; 
thus, they qualify as instrumental variables (Kennedy, 2008). Examples include human capital 
support available from parents if the child creates a new firm (family cohesion), the “future 
orientation” dimension from GLOBE (transgenerational control intention), years of study (fear of 
failure), and parents’ equity share in a potential start-up of the child (family equity stake). We 
used those instrumental variables to compute the estimated values of the four independent 
variables. The estimated values were then used to run separate regressions for the dependent 
variable (expected family discount). For all four independent variables we find that endogeneity 
is not a concern, as both the Wu-Hausman F test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test are 
nonsignificant (the smallest p-value is 0.25 for transgenerational control intention). 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the results of our regression analysis. Model 1 includes the control variables 
only. In Model 2 we add our independent variables. Family cohesion is positively and 
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significantly related to family discount (β=1.691, p=0.018), which confirms H1. H2 is not 
supported, as transgenerational control is not significantly related to family discount (β=0.145, 
p=0.883). Fear of failure is negatively and significantly related to family discount (β=-1.595, 
p=0.023), which supports H3. The amount of equity that the family holds in the firm is negatively 
and significantly related to family discount (β=-3.940, p<0.001), supporting H4. Comparing 
Model 1 and Model 2 reveals that the addition of our independent variables increases R2 
significantly (p<0.001). In Model 3, we added the HEBE moderator as an additional independent 
variable, which fails to reach significance (β=-0.399, p=0.493). In Model 4, we added the four 
interaction terms. As hypothesized, the HEBE * family cohesion interaction term is negative and 
significant (β=-1.353, p=0.036), which confirms H5a. H5b finds no support, as the HEBE * 
transgenerational control interaction is not significant (β=0.480, p=0.474). Hypotheses H5c and 
H5d are supported, as the HEBE * fear of failure (β=1.272, p=0.032) and the HEBE * family 
equity stake interactions (β=2.561, p<0.01) are significant. Adding the interaction terms 
significantly increased R2 (p<0.01).  
To facilitate interpretation of our significant interactions, we plotted them in Figures 1, 2, 
and 3. Figure 1 shows that the relationship between family cohesion and expected family 
discount is generally positive but weaker (less positive) when HEBE exists, which offers 
additional support for H1 and H5a. Figure 2 shows that fear of failure and expected family 
discount are negatively related. The relationship is weaker (less negative) when HEBE exists, 
which corresponds to H3 and H5c. Following the same logic, Figure 3 illustrates that HEBE 
weakens the negative link between family equity stake and expected family discount, which lends 
further support to H4 and H5d.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Figures 1-3 here 
------------------------------------------------- 
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Robustness tests 
As the distribution of our dependent variable shows fat tails at both extremes, we calculated 
a separate generalized linear model (GLM). Results are identical for the main variables and the 
interaction terms, both in significance levels and directions. We performed two additional tests to 
evaluate whether the indicated discount expectations represent wishful thinking or realistic 
estimations of respondents. The GUESSS data set contains complete answers from 128 
respondents who indicated that they had already assumed control of their parents’ firm. They 
were asked: “Assume that a family-external buyer would have had to pay an amount of 100 for 
the family firm’s total equity. How much did you have to pay?” As with our dependent variable, 
we deducted the numbers from 100 to represent the family discount that was actually given. The 
average of 55% (standard deviation [SD]=36.94) is very similar to the mean discount in the 
sample for the main analysis (57.1%, SD=36.31).  
We also performed an out-of-sample check with data from a separate research project in 
Germany. In that database, which contained 561 family firm owners who had already assumed 
control of their parents’ firm, respondents indicated they had received a family discount of 59.9% 
(SD=39.9), which is not significantly different from the expected discounts we found for 
Germany in our main sample (59.1%; p=0.764). We also note that 64% of respondents have 
already been working in their parents’ firm (10 hours per week [median]) for two years 
[median]). Hence, they should have good insights into relevant aspects of the firm, which is 
further supported by their claim that they possess reliable knowledge of the firm’s financial 
condition (mean=5.14 on a scale from 1 to 7; SD=1.67). This supports the credibility of their 
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answers in general; thus, we regard our respondents as reliable key informants (Kumar et al., 
1993).6  
We conducted a robustness check with a subsample of respondents where only one parent 
owned a family firm (N=1’972). For the main effects, we found almost identical results; only fear 
of failure was no longer significant (p=0.179). Although in the right direction, two of our 
interaction effects (family cohesion * HEBE and fear of failure * HEBE) failed to remain 
significant (p>0.05). Thus, while the underlying pattern is broadly consistent, results do not fully 
hold, possibly because the family logic and the norms that it entails are particularly prevalent if 
both parents are family firm owners. 
We assessed effect sizes in our models. The change in R2 is close to (Model 2 versus Model 
1) or smaller than (Model 4 versus Model 3) the often-used threshold for practical significance of 
1%, a likely result because interaction terms, which we added in Model 4, often have small effect 
sizes (cf. Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Laspita et al., 2012). We assessed odds ratios as indicators 
of effect size (cf. Autio et al., 2013) by performing a median split with our dependent variable 
(median = 60) and logistic regressions. The odds ratios for our significant relationships range 
between 0.875 and 1.156 (closest to 1 is 1.064),7 which are acceptable values compared to other 
recent studies (cf. Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Norman et al., 2013). We calculated f2 (Cohens’ f 
squared) for all our significant relationships; the range is 0.001 to 0.003. While this is admittedly 
small, it is acceptable compared to a recent meta analysis (cf. Aguinis et al., 2005) and other 
recent studies (e.g., Laspita et al., 2012). In general, small effect sizes can have substantial 
theoretical and practical value (cf. Aguinis et al., 2005). Even a trivial increase in our 
                                                                    
6 It is not our intent to explore the accuracy of value estimates, even though the estimates seem to match actual 
family discounts rather well. The main goal of our paper is to investigate the cognitive processes of actors who deal 
with various norms that are part of the family logic and how these norms are impacted by the presence of a largely 
competing logic, i.e., the market logic. 
7 Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive association between variables, and odds ratios of less than 1 indicate a 
negative association. 
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independent variables translates into significant monetary values that are reflected in the family 
discount variable. 
DISCUSSION 
We explored the price discounts that next-generation family members expect to receive in 
comparison to nonfamily buyers when assuming control of their parents’ private family firm. 
Familial cohesion increases discount expectations, while successors’ fear of failure and family 
equity stake reduce discount expectations. We theorized that these situational stimuli impact 
discount expectations as they focus attention on different social norms within the family logic, 
notably parental altruism, filial reciprocity, and filial duty. Our argument that successors to whom 
the market logic is highly accessible through education in business or economics are less likely to 
attend to the stimuli associated with family norms is supported.  
Our study adds to entrepreneurial exit and succession literatures (Dehlen et al., 2014; 
DeTienne & Chirico, 2013; Kammerlander, 2014; Wennberg et al., 2011) by shedding more light 
on the relationship between family norms and financial implications of the family-internal exit 
route. Although widely overlooked in the succession literature, this topic constitutes an important 
part of succession planning (Eddleston et al., 2013; Handler, 1989; Sharma et al., 2003; Ward, 
1988) and is a crucial determinant of family firm survival (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). 
Allowing for family discounts is equivalent to a cost of equity capital subsidy at later-generation 
family firms, with supposedly important consequences for investment patterns and strategic 
preferences. Our research also extends literature on owner transgenerational control intention 
(Zellweger et al., 2013) by exploring how this socioemotional wealth dimension affects the 
financial implications of a family internal transfer of control, thus complementing Zellweger et 
al.’s (2012) work on family-external transfer prices. 
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Beyond the entrepreneurship and family business context, we speak to Graebner and 
Eisenhardt (2004), who explored the interdependent relationships between buyers and sellers and 
who were the first to depict change in corporate control as a social exchange. Following their 
argument that courtship between acquirer and seller biases corporate control transactions and 
related prices, we suggest that for children and parents as buyers and sellers, legitimacy concerns 
rooted in familial exchange norms bias perceptions about appropriate prices. We provide a 
nuanced perspective about price formation in this social exchange (Beckert, 2011), where actors 
are embedded in ongoing personal relationships (Granovetter & Swedberg, 2001), adhere to 
social norms (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003), and build price expectations according to what they 
consider just and legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Durkheim, 1947). 
We contribute to institutional logics literature, in particular to the microfoundations of 
institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012), by exploring the 
multidimensionality of the family logic, which is an important addition to management 
scholarship that tends to equate it with norms of altruism, loyalty, and paternalism (Greenwood et 
al., 2010; Miller et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). Drawing from family sociology, however, it 
becomes evident that there is more richness built into the family logic, which challenges the 
many attempts to treat this logic as a monolithic way of sense making. Although norms of 
reciprocity and filial duty play a role in family relationships (Bengtson, 1993; Kohli & 
Kuenemund, 2003), they have been overlooked within the institutional logics literature. Our 
study shows that the various family norms entail contradictory indications of what constitutes a 
legitimate family discount and highlights an important but, so far, underinvestigated form of 
institutional complexity (see Greenwood et al., 2011 for a review). It also lends empirical support 
to arguments about the powerful role of education in determining accessibility of certain logics 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pache & Santos, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012). We contribute to 
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competing logics literature (see Greenwood et al., 2011 for a review) by showing that familial 
legitimacy considerations have less impact on price expectations if successors are trained in 
business or economics. 
Limitations and future research 
Because we study price expectations and not actual transfer prices, price determination in 
intrafamily transfers of corporate ownership may be more complex. Intervening factors include 
family constellation and negotiating power of actors. Our theorizing, however, explores sense 
making among potential successors and not actual results from a familial negotiation. This study 
focuses on microfoundations, which calls for individual-level data collected at the source and 
from successors with a family business background who have reasonable insight into their 
parents’ firm. We achieved this goal with the database at hand. In addition, a prospective view, 
which our successors apply when indicating price estimates, avoids the survivor bias of 
retrospective studies and is not uncommon in company valuation that often draws from future 
cash flow scenarios (cp. Carter et al., 2003). Robustness checks show that actual realized 
discounts, both in the GUESSS sample and in an independent sample, are highly similar to the 
expected discounts that we found.  
Transgenerational control is an important concern of entrepreneurial parents (Dehlen et al., 
2014) who desire that a child assumes control of the business. Although this gives children and 
their deliberations about an appropriate price a high level of legitimacy, replicating our study 
with realized transfers holds further promise. Because our focus on the buyer does not shed light 
on the sense making of incumbent owners, scholars could apply our framework to explore sellers’ 
sense making. Our study may not apply equally to transfers at the same generational level and 
among more or less distant relatives. Because interdependence abounds in other constellations, 
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such as work teams, joint ventures, and, more broadly, in agreements and transactions where 
parties interact over multiple rounds and across various domains, scholars could investigate in 
what ways interdependence alters the financial characteristics of such transactions. 
We used survey data, which raises some concerns about the reliability of inferences; 
therefore, we addressed nonresponse, social desirability, and common method biases. Even 
though our analysis is unable to completely rule out common method bias, the limitations of our 
empirical approach have to be weighed against the opportunity to study institutional 
microprocesses with a large-scale quantitative study (Thornton et al., 2012). Although our 
adjusted R2- values might appear low, there is an inconclusive debate on appropriate levels of 
effect sizes (cf. Ferguson, 2009; Hair et al., 2010; Lattin et al., 2003). Our R2- values, however, 
are in the same range or higher than those reported in recent studies that use larger (e.g., Lee et 
al., 2011) or smaller (e.g., Grichnik et al., 2014) samples. Most importantly, even a trivial 
increase in our independent variables translates into significant monetary values that are reflected 
in family discounts, which suggests that our results indeed matter. Nevertheless, we note that the 
amount of variance in family discounts explained by the studied variables suggests that many 
other factors besides the ones tested in the present study explain family discounts.  
Our data is cross-sectional, which prevents us from drawing valid conclusions on causality. 
Given our in-depth theoretical reasoning, however, we believe that causality likely exists in the 
expected direction. Potential endogeneity concerns are mitigated because, theoretically, our key 
variables are likely exogenous to family discount expectations; empirically, our tests show that 
endogeneity is not a major issue. Although better measures may capture the four familial norms, 
such measures were unavailable. We acknowledge that business or economics education may not 
be able to capture all the nuances of the market logic, such as negotiations in a transaction. Even 
though we would have liked to measure family norms and the market logic directly, capturing 
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logics via stimuli and sources of logic accessibility is theoretically sound and at the same time a 
challenge for the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012). 
We directed questions to successors, which may be an issue when trying to capture 
parental altruism and parental desire for legacy creation. Given the deep embeddedness of 
family successors, however, our respondents should have strong insights into family cohesion 
and the intention of parents to transfer the firm to a child. We have no reason to believe that 
parents would assess family cohesion and transgenerational control intention to a systematically 
different degree. Also, it appears plausible that the positive effect between family cohesion and 
discount would also hold if questions had been directed to parents. 
Our results suggest further study of control variables that emerged as significant (e.g., age 
effects). Because female successors consistently expect a higher family discount, further research 
seems warranted applying gender theories. Most of our country-level control variables are 
significant. For instance, family discount is higher in wealthier nations where parents seem to be 
able to afford lower transaction prices. If a country’s tax regime allows parents to bequeath 
wealth unevenly to children, expected discounts are higher. Also, inheritance tax is positively 
related to family discount as lower transaction prices will reduce the tax burden. Finally, because 
discounts translate into cost of equity capital subsidies, family discounts may create incentives to 
take less efficient allocation decisions for that capital, an area ripe for future research. 
Practical implications 
The topic of our study holds wide practical relevance because many family firms 
throughout the world are transferred from one generation to the next. Opening up the black box 
of intergenerational transfer pricing for family business ownership should help incumbent 
entrepreneurs and their successors take apart the complex deliberations at play, facilitate 
discussions, and ultimately determine appropriate transfer prices. Complexity emerges not 
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primarily from technical challenges tied to valuation but from the interdependent relationship of 
parent and child as seller and buyer. The family internal market of corporate control is an 
intimate one, where the norms of family rule and the laws of the market are partly suspended. 
Understanding the inner workings of the family logic and how familial norms affect legitimacy 
perceptions about transaction prices may help reduce family conflicts in the succession context. 
CONCLUSION 
By illuminating family discount expectations related to private family firm ownership 
transfers, we open the black box of how the family logic guides intergenerational transfers of 
organizational ownership. Exploring how individuals attend and respond to family norms and 
how the market logic impacts this process holds wide theoretical and practical relevance in light 
of the prevalence of private family firms and family internal succession around the globe. 
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TABLE 1: Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Respondent age 23.76 4.74 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Respondent gender 0.45 0.50 -.033 1 
3 # older siblings 1.02 1.40 .054** -.018 1 
4 Study level 0.85 0.35 -.252** .057** .031 1 
5 Ent. Education 0.80 0.40 -.064** -.005 -.038* -.050** 1 
6 Family business perf.  4.72 1.33 -.110** .041* .026 .066** -.031 1 
7 # of employees 30.3 95.83 -.068** -.019 .013 -.021 .038* .155** 1 
8 Construction 0.10 0.30 .004 -.078** -.019 -.028 .016 .002 .004 1 
9 Services 0.19 0.39 .007 .036* -.011 -.049** .004 .008 -.054** -.165** 1 
10 Years family ownership 21.78 25.75 .048** -.076** -.004 -.151** .053** -.022 .152** .003 -.090** 1 
11 CEO family member 0.13 0.34 .033 .043* .053** .046** -.017 -.062** .004 -.046** .010 -.108** 1 
12 Personal equity share 10.98 21.12 .113** .006 .046** .048** -.069** .036* -.035* .001 -.013 -.100** .022 1 
13 Working experience 0.36 0.48 -.049** .075** .020 .071** .028 -.030 .041* -.006 -.003 -.073** .159** -.141** 1 
14 Insights financial perf.  5.14 1.67 -.024 -.057** -.023 .012 -.005 .198** .028 -.003 -.024 .013 -.095** .110** -.195** 1 
15 Affective commitment 5.16 1.47 -.039* .038* -.013 .008 -.018 .219** .067** .001 -.012 .093** -.114** .063** -.140** .449** 
16 Succession feasibility 4.35 1.97 -.013 .025 .032 -.032 -.012 .024 .051** -.008 -.016 .018 .010 .021 .010 .076** 
17 GDP per capita 22857 13791 -.027 -.084** -.027 -.307** .066** -.058** .057** .039* .075** .255** -.092** -.205** -.184** -.070** 
18 Performance orientation 4.11 0.40 .032 -.048** .010 -.145** .067** .020 .087** -.002 .064** .191** -.110** -.163** -.026 -.090** 
19 Group collectivism 4.85 0.63 .037* .075** .013 .234** -.063** .036* -.073** -.020 -.061** -.239** .086** .201** .118** .080** 
20 Power distance 5.19 0.37 .036* .037* -.025 .165** -.038* .009 -.081** .005 -.043* -.131** .049** .145** .050** .063** 
21 Testamentary freedom 0.67 0.10 -.073** .003 -.015 .047** -.010 .020 .021 .002 -.047** -.083** .010 .026 .015 .103** 
22 Inheritance tax 0.43 0.50 -.096** -.069** -.045* -.210** .055** -.074** .033 .052** .034* .159** -.039* -.160** -.176** -.029 
23 Family cohesion 5.84 1.16 .020 .137** .001 .053** -.049** .140** -.005 .001 -.009 -.043* -.001 .053** .015 .201** 
24 Transg. control int. 4.65 1.72 -.018 .000 .029 .058** -.024 .220** .087** .013 -.046** .135** -.041* .130** -.086** .473** 
25 Fear of failure 3.85 1.69 -.037* .083** .042* .012 -.024 .048** .003 .023 -.011 -.052** .032 .022 .060** -.022 
26 Family equity stake 81.84 29.59 .025 -.005 -.040* -.023 .022 .012 -.043* .005 -.048** .093** -.367** .066** -.161** .109** 
27 Higher ed. in B&E 0.42 0.49 -.134** -.015 -.035* .021 .030 .031 .110** -.030 -.025 -.025 -.021 -.036* -.003 .066** 
28 Family discount 57.06 36.31 -.080** .059** -.011 -.027 -.014 -.017 -.011 -.009 .022 .004 .036* -.056** -.047** -.027 
N=3,293, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01 
41 
TABLE 1 (continued): Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations 
  Mean S.D. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1 Respondent age 23.76 4.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Respondent gender 0.45 0.50 
3 # older siblings 1.02 1.40 
4 Study level 0.85 0.35 
5 Ent. Education 0.80 0.40 
6 Family business perf. 4.72 1.33 
7 # of employees 30.3 95.83 
8 Construction 0.10 0.30 
9 Services 0.19 0.39 
10 Years family ownership 21.78 25.75 
11 CEO family member 0.13 0.34 
12 Personal equity share 10.98 21.12 
13 Working experience 0.36 0.48 
14 Insights financial perf. 5.14 1.67 
15 Affective commitment 5.16 1.47 1 
16 Succession feasibility 4.35 1.97 .062** 1 
17 GDP per capita 22857 13791 -.028 .057** 1 
18 Performance orientation 4.11 0.40 -.041* .050** .605** 1 
19 Group collectivism 4.85 0.63 .039* -.076** -.869** -.669** 1 
20 Power distance 5.19 0.37 .011 -.103** -.665** -.583** .743** 1 
21 Testamentary freedom 0.67 0.10 .046** .025 -.319** -.403** .257** .115** 1 
22 Inheritance tax 0.43 0.50 -.015 .043* .747** .197** -.744** -.397** -.035* 1 
23 Family cohesion 5.84 1.16 .289** .004 -.131** -.111** .134** .085** .077** -.082** 1 
24 Transg. control int. 4.65 1.72 .640** .064** -.200** -.146** .195** .132** .093** -.147** .275** 1 
25 Fear of failure 3.85 1.69 .113** .381** .027 .050** -.038* -.015 -.018 .018 .042* .137** 1 
26 Family equity stake 81.84 29.59 .102** -.005 -.023 -.028 .027 -.005 .041* -.008 .045** .072** -.083** 1 
27 Higher ed. in B&E 0.42 0.49 .009 .034* .057** .037* -.056** -.112** .048** .080** .003 .030 .005 .036* 1 
28 Family discount 57.06 36.31 -.018 .021 .161** -.025 -.085** -.047** .059** .204** .027 -.044* -.016 -.084** .011 
N=3,293, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01 
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TABLE 2: Results of OLS regression analyses 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff.  S.E. p Coeff. S.E. p Coeff. S.E. p Coeff. S.E. p 
constant 59.332 1.052 *** 59.550 1.052 *** 59.641 1.061 *** 59.647 1.059 *** 
Control variables 
Respondent age -2.645 .897 ** -2.701 .895 ** -2.763 .900 ** -2.874 .898 ** 
Respondent gender 2.490 .624 *** 2.446 .629 *** 2.440 .629 *** 2.442 .627 *** 
# older siblings .173 .713   .140 .712   .124 .712   .099 .711   
Study level .683 .781   .620 .778   .622 .778   .638 .777   
Ent. Education -.934 .595   -.834 .593   -.828 .593   -.911 .593   
Family business perf. .177 .691   .039 .692   .038 .692   .010 .690   
# of employees -.348 .450   -.451 .450   -.421 .452   -.424 .452   
Construction -.334 .345   -.345 .344   -.355 .345   -.367 .344   
Services .175 .381   .101 .379   .094 .380   .132 .379   
Years family ownership -.332 .578   -.203 .591   -.221 .592   -.183 .591   
CEO family member 2.010 .878 * .557 .934   .553 .934   .527 .932   
Personal equity share -.663 .555   -.525 .555   -.532 .555   -.521 .554   
Working experience -.561 .680   -.852 .682   -.849 .682   -.905 .681   
Insights financial perf. -1.009 .869   -1.266 .904   -1.232 .906   -1.218 .905   
Affective commitment -.621 .875   -.788 1.044   -.820 1.046   -.800 1.043   
Succession feasibility .660 .637   1.273 .687   1.279 .687   1.371 .686 * 
GDP per capita 12.981 1.739 *** 12.738 1.745 *** 12.713 1.745 *** 12.662 1.742 *** 
Performance orientation -.327 1.214   -.261 1.210   -.212 1.213   -.146 1.210   
Group collectivism 12.423 2.089 *** 12.520 2.088 *** 12.648 2.097 *** 12.761 2.092 *** 
Power distance -.062 1.255   -.249 1.259   -.351 1.268   -.401 1.267   
Testamentary freedom 2.412 .584 *** 2.378 .582 *** 2.382 .582 *** 2.390 .581 *** 
Inheritance tax 7.439 1.444 *** 7.592 1.441 *** 7.687 1.448 *** 7.820 1.445 *** 
 
Independent variables 
Family cohesion       1.691 .715 * 1.691 .715 * 1.995 .727 ** 
Transgenerational control intention 
  
    .145 .978   .165 .979   .009 .986   
Fear of failure       -1.595 .702 * -1.594 .702 * -1.958 .717 ** 
Family equity stake       -3.940 .870 *** -3.920 .870 *** -4.411 .877 *** 
 
Moderating variable 
Higher education in 
business or economics 
(HEBE) 
            -.399 .582   -1.261 .775   
 
Interaction terms 
Family cohesion * HEBE                   -1.353 .645 * 
Transgenerational control intention * HEBE 
  
  
              .480 .672   
Fear of failure * HEBE                   1.272 .593 * 
Family equity stake * HEBE 
  
                2.561 .754 ** 
                          
Respondents 3293 3293 3293 3293 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.085 0.085 0.089 
R2 change   0.008*** 0 0.005** 
F 13.613*** 12.743*** 12.287*** 11.387*** 
Note. Standard errors in italics. Standardized variables were used. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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FIGURE 1: Family Cohesion and Higher Education in Business or Economics (HEBE) 
  
 
FIGURE 2: Fear of Failure and Higher Education in Business or Economics (HEBE) 
  
 
FIGURE 3: Family Equity Stake and Higher Education in Business or Economics (HEBE) 
  
 
